Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions by Peters, H.J.M. et al.
  
 
Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity
functions
Citation for published version (APA):
Peters, H. J. M., Schröder, M. J. W., & Vermeulen, A. J. (2013). Ex post Nash consistent representation of
effectivity functions. (GSBE Research Memorandum; No. 049). Maastricht: GSBE.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2013
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
	Hans Peters, Marc Schröder, 
Dries Vermeulen 
 
Ex post Nash consistent 
representations of effectivity 
functions 
 
RM/13/049 
  
Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity
functions
Hans Peters∗, Marc Schro¨der∗, Dries Vermeulen∗
This version, June 2013
Abstract
We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alter-
natives. We assume that players have incomplete information with
respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the
characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash
consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the
distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the
effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in
pure strategies) for any preference profile.
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1 Introduction
An effectivity function (Moulin and Peleg, 1982) describes the allocation
of power among coalitions of individuals. More precisely, given a set of
individuals and a set of alternatives, an effectivity function assigns to each
coalition of individuals a collection of subsets of alternatives. Effectivity
functions derive from many concepts in game theory and social choice theory:
for instance game forms, social choice correspondences, simple games. More
generally, effectivity functions can be used to describe the distribution of
power or rights. For instance, a constitution can be modelled as a game
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form (Ga¨rdenfors, 1981; Peleg, 1998): alternatives are social states, and to
say that a coalition is effective for a set of alternatives means that this group
of individuals is legally entitled to the social state being in the designated
set.
According to this last interpretation an effectivity function is a central-
ized concept describing the rights of individuals. This leads directly to the
question if we can find a set of decentralized rules (practical laws) such that
individuals and coalitions, by acting according to these rules, obtain the
same rights as described by the effectivity function? In more formal terms,
can we find a game form which provides all coalitions with the same power
as the effectivity function. This question was already answered in Moulin
(1983), who showed that any monotonic and superadditive effectivity func-
tion can be represented by a game form. An important further question is if
we can find such a representing game form that is stable in some sense. Peleg
et al. (2002) answered this question by characterizing effectivity functions
that have a Nash consistent representation, i.e., a game form representing
the effectivity function and having a Nash equilibrium for any profile of
preferences of the individuals. See Peleg and Peters (2010) for an extensive
treatment of this topic and related issues.
An important open question in this area is the following. If we take
into account that information may be incomplete – individuals are not sure
about the preferences, i.e., types, of other individuals – when is it possible
to have a representation of an effectivity function that is Bayesian Nash con-
sistent? d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) consider ordinal Bayesian incentive
compatible representations of committees: they study effectivity functions
derived from simple games and their representation by so-called decision
schemes, which assign probability distributions over the alternatives, such
that there exists a Bayesian incentive compatible Nash equilibrium under in-
complete information. Recently, Peleg and Zamir (2013) show that, without
additional restrictions except for the standard ones, effectivity functions can
be Bayesian Nash consistently represented by such decision schemes; their
proof of this result uses the uniform core (Abdou and Keiding, 1991). The
question under which conditions such a representation by a deterministic
game form exists, remains open.
In the present paper we impose a considerably stronger requirement:
given an effectivity function, when does there exist a representing game
form such that, for any information structure (i.e., vector of type sets of
the players), there exists an ex post Nash equilibrium for any preference
profile, that is, a strategy combination which results in a Nash equilibrium
whatever the realization of the types? One the one hand, this is a very
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desirable situation, since players do not have to rely on their beliefs about
the types of the others. On the other hand, as can be expected, this re-
quirement turns out to be rather restrictive. Our main result is as follows.
An effectivity function (for n individuals or players) has an ex post Nash
consistent representation exactly if there exists an (n − 1)-player coalition
and a subset C of alternatives for which this coalition is effective, such that
all other (n − 1)-player coalitions are effective for all singletons in this set
C. In the case n = 2 this condition is equivalent to at least one of the two
players being a so-called singleton player: a singleton player is a player for
whom all minimal sets for which this player is effective, are singletons. We
also show that, if only one of the players has more than one type, then ex
post Nash consistency imposes no additional restrictions compared to Nash
consistency (as in Peleg et al., 2002). In the final part of the paper we show
that, even if an effectivity function does not have an ex post Nash consistent
representation, it may still be the case that it has such a representation if
the numbers of types are restricted – a special case being the mentioned one
where only one player has more than one type. Throughout the paper we
concentrate on existence of ex post Nash equilibria and leave other possible
properties (e.g., Pareto optimality of such equilibria) from consideration.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces defini-
tions and notations. In Section 3, we present our basic representing game
form. This game form is extended and modified in several ways in the rest
of the paper. Section 4 analyzes the case of two players, and Section 5
generalizes to more than two players.
2 The model
Notation. For a finite set D, |D| denotes the number of elements of D;
P (D) denotes the set of all subsets of D; P0(D) denotes the set of all non-
empty subsets of D.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} (where n ≥ 2) be the set of players, and let A be
a finite set of alternatives, |A| ≥ 2. A binary relation R over A is a subset
R ⊆ A×A, where (a, b) ∈ R is written as aRb. A binary relation is complete
if for all a, b ∈ A, we have aRb or bRa. A binary relation is transitive if
aRb and bRc jointly imply aRc, for all a, b, c ∈ A. A preference ordering R
on A is a complete and transitive binary relation. The set of all preference
orderings on A is denoted by W . If R ∈ W and a, b ∈ A, then aPb means
aRb and not bRa. If a ∈ A and R ∈W , then L(a,R) = {b ∈ A | aRb} is the
lower contour set of a, i.e. the set of alternatives not strictly preferred to a.
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For a set S, WS = {f | f : S →W} is the set of mappings from S to W .
An effectivity function (EF) is a function E : P (N) → P (P0(A)) that
satisfies the following conditions: (i) E(N) = P0(A); (ii) E(∅) = ∅; and (iii)
A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ P0(N). As a general interpretation, B ∈ E(S) means
that coalition S can force the final alternative to be an element of B. The
interpretation of the three conditions is fairly obvious.
An effectivity function E is monotonic (with respect to players as well
as alternatives) if
[B ∈ E(S), B′ ∈ P0(A), B ⊆ B′, and S ⊆ S′]⇒ B′ ∈ E(S′).
For B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N), B is minimal for coalition S if B ∈ E(S) and
there is no B′ ∈ E(S) such that B′  B. A monotonic effectivity function
E is completely determined by these minimal sets.
The effectivity function E is superadditive if
[Bi ∈ E(Si), i = 1, 2, and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅]⇒ B1 ∩B2 ∈ E(S1 ∪ S2).
Note that a superadditive effectivity function is also monotonic with respect
to players: for S ⊆ S′ and B ∈ E(S), superadditivity implies that B =
B ∩ A ∈ E(S ∪ (S′ \ S)) = E(S′). Monotonicity and superadditivity are
natural properties in view of the interpretation given above. Moreover,
effectivity functions derived from game forms have these properties.
The polar of E is the effectivity function E∗ defined by: E∗(∅) = ∅, and
for S ∈ P0(N)
E∗(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | B ∩B′ 6= ∅ for all B′ ∈ E(N \ S)}.
Thus, if B ∈ E∗(S), then the complementary coalition N \S cannot prevent
S from obtaining an alternative from B; in particular, A \B /∈ E(N \ S).
E is maximal if E is superadditive and E = E∗. Note that a maximal
effectivity function is also monotonic. Indeed, a superadditive effectivity
function is monotonic with respect to players. Also, if B ∈ E∗(S) and
B ⊆ C, then obviously C∩B′ 6= ∅ for all B′ ∈ E(N \S) and thus C ∈ E∗(S).
Hence if E is maximal then E is monotonic with respect to alternatives since
E∗ is.
The following results are well-known (e.g., Peleg and Peters, 2010; Boros
et al., 2010; or Crama and Hammer, 2011). For completeness, we provide
the proofs.
Proposition 2.1. Let E be a monotonic effectivity function. The following
statements are equivalent:
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(i) E = E∗.
(ii) For all B ∈ P0(A) and for all S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ E(S) if and only if
B ∩B′ 6= ∅ for all B′ ∈ E(N \ S).
(iii) For all B ∈ P0(A) and for all S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ E(S) if and only if
A \B /∈ E(N \ S).
Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) is obvious. To prove the implication
(ii)⇒ (iii), assume (ii). If B ∈ E(S) for some B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N),
then, by (ii), A \ B /∈ E(N \ S). Conversely, if A \ B /∈ E(N \ S) for some
B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N), then by (ii) there must be some B′ ∈ E(S) such
that (A \B) ∩B′ = ∅. Clearly, B′ ⊆ B, so that B ∈ E(S), again by (ii).
Finally, to prove the implication (iii)⇒ (i), assume (iii). If B ∈ E∗(S)
for some B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N), then A\B /∈ E(N \S), hence B ∈ E(S)
by (iii). Conversely, if B ∈ E(S) for some B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N), then
A \ B /∈ E(N \ S) by (iii). Let B′ ∈ E(N \ S), then B′ 6⊆ A \ B by
monotonicity, so that B ∩B′ 6= ∅. So B ∈ E∗(S).
Remark 2.2. Note that, in the proof of Proposition 2.1, monotonicity of E
is only used to prove that E(S) ⊆ E∗(S) for all S ∈ P (N) in the last part
of the proof. This would also follow directly from superadditivity of E: if
B ∈ E(S) then superadditivity would imply B∩B′ 6= ∅ for all B′ ∈ E(N \S),
so that B ∈ E∗(S). Hence, Proposition 2.1 also holds with superadditivity
instead of monotonicity.
The following result will be useful in the sequel.
Proposition 2.3. Let E be a maximal effectivity function. Then for each
minimal B ∈ E(S) and alternative a ∈ B, there is a minimal B′ ∈ E(N \S)
such that B ∩B′ = {a}.
Proof. Let S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ E(S), and a ∈ B. By superadditivity, B∩B′ 6= ∅
for all B′ ∈ E(N \ S). Suppose that for each minimal B′ ∈ E(N \ S) there
is some b 6= a such that b ∈ B ∩B′. Then (B \ {a})∩B′ 6= ∅ for all minimal
B′ ∈ E(N \S), hence for all B′ ∈ E(N \S). Thus, B \{a} ∈ E∗(S) = E(S).
So B is not minimal in E(S).
A game form is an (n + 2)-tuple Γ = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn;pi;A), where (i) Σi
is the (non-empty, finite) set of possible actions1 of player i ∈ N ; and (ii)
1We reserve the term ‘strategy’ for game forms with incomplete information later on.
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pi : Σ1 × · · · × Σn → A is the outcome function. Throughout the paper we
assume that pi is surjective. For S ∈ P0(N) we denote ΣS =
∏
i∈S Σ
i.
Let Γ = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn;pi;A) be a game form. For S ∈ P0(N) and σS ∈ ΣS ,
we define B(σS) = {pi(σS , σN\S) | σN\S ∈ ΣN\S}. The effectivity function
EΓ, associated with Γ, is defined in the following way: EΓ(∅) = ∅ and for
S ∈ P0(N),
EΓ(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | B(σS) ⊆ B for some σS ∈ ΣS}.
Note that EΓ is monotonic and superadditive. Let E : P (N) → P (P0(A))
be an effectivity function. A game form Γ is a representation of E if E(S) =
EΓ(S) for every S ∈ P0(N). Basically, this means that the game form
distributes the same power among the players as the effectivity function
does.
Remark 2.4. If B ∈ P0(A) is a minimal set of coalition S ∈ P0(N) in
EΓ(S), then there exists an action profile σS ∈ ΣS such that B(σS) = B.
An information structure is an n-tuple T = (T 1, . . . , Tn), where T i is
the finite set of types of player i = 1, . . . , n. We denote by TN =
∏
i∈N T
i
the set of type profiles. With some abuse of notation we denote by W T
the set of all preference ordering profiles: a profile RT ∈W T has dimension∑
i∈N |T i| and assigns a preference ordering to each type of each player.
If Γ = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn;pi;A) is a game form, then (Γ, T,RT ) is a game of in-
complete information in the sense of Harsanyi (1967). The set of strategies
of player i in this game is the set Si = {si | si : T i → Σi}. We denote
SN =
∏
i∈N S
i. We do not introduce type probabilities since we will only
consider ex post Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ SN
is an ex post (Nash) equilibrium (EPE) of (Γ, T,RT ) if for all i ∈ N , all
t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TN and all σi ∈ Σi,
pi(s(t))Rt
i
pi(s−i(t−i), σi),
where s−i(t−i) is the vector (sj(tj))j 6=i. Let s ∈ SN be an EPE, then we
call pi(s(t)) the Nash outcome for t ∈ TN . Game form Γ is ex post (Nash)
consistent for T if (Γ, T,RT ) has an EPE for every RT ∈ W T . If T is
an arbitrary collection of information structures – that is, with possibly
different type set cardinalities – then we say that game form Γ is ex post
(Nash) consistent for T if (Γ, T,RT ) has an EPE for every T ∈ T and every
RT ∈W T . Specifically, if T = {T} with |T i| = 1 for every i ∈ N , then an ex
post consistent game form Γ is Nash consistent (cf. Peleg et al., 2002). We
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say that effectivity function E has an ex post consistent representation for
a collection T of information structures if there exists a game form Γ such
that Γ is a representation of E and Γ is ex post consistent for T . We say
that E has an ex post consistent representation if there exists a game form
Γ such that Γ represents E and Γ is ex post consistent for every information
structure T .
Lemma 2.5. Suppose s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ SN is an EPE of (Γ, T,RT ). Then
B(s−i(t−i)) ⊆ L(pi(s(t)), Rti) for all t ∈ T .
Proof. Let t ∈ TN . Let a ∈ B(s−i(t−i)). Then there is σi ∈ Σi such
that pi(s−i(t−i), σi) = a. Hence pi(s(t))Rtia, since s is an EPE. Therefore
a ∈ L(pi(s(t)), Rti).
Remark 2.6. If s ∈ SN is an EPE of (Γ, T,RT ), then Lemma 2.5 and
monotonicity imply L(pi(s(t)), Rt
i
) ∈ EΓ(N \ {i}) for every i ∈ N and every
ti ∈ T i.
Notation In the sequel, instead of E({i}), we usually write E(i).
3 A representing game form
In this section we present the basic game form which is used throughout the
paper. Later, we will extend and modify this game form in several ways.
Alternative representing game forms can be found in many places, notably
Peleg (1998), Peleg et al. (2002), Peleg and Peters (2010) and Boros et al.
(2010).
Let E be a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fix
a numbering of the alternatives in A, say A = {a1, . . . , a|A|}. For i ∈ N
let F i = {(S,B) | i ∈ S ⊆ N and B ∈ E(S)}. We define the game form
G0 = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn;pi;A) as follows. The set of actions of i ∈ N is the set
Σi = {(f, k) | f ∈ F i and k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}}.
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ ΣN = ∏i∈N Σi, where σi = (f i, ki) ∈ Σi for
i ∈ N . We say that coalition S ∈ P0(N) is formed if there is B ∈ E(S)
such that f i = (S,B) for all i ∈ S. Define D ∈ P0(A) as follows. If
no coalition is formed, then D = A. Otherwise, let {S1, . . . , Sr} be the
collection of formed coalitions. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, there is Bj ∈ E(Sj)
such that f i = (Sj , Bj) for all i ∈ Sj . Then let D =
⋂r
j=1Bj . Note that
D 6= ∅ because E is superadditive and formed coalitions are pairwise disjoint.
Suppose D = {aj1 , . . . , aj|D|} with j1 < . . . < j|D|. We define pi(σ) = ajp ,
where p =
∑
i∈N
ki (mod |D|) + 1.
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Proposition 3.1. G0 is a representation of E.
Proof. We first show that E(S) ⊆ EG0(S) for all S ∈ P0(N). Let S ∈ P0(N)
and B ∈ E(S). Choose σi = ((S,B), 1) for all i ∈ S. Then the coalition S is
formed and hence by definition of pi, pi(σS , τN\S) ∈ B for all τN\S ∈ ΣN\S .
So, B(σS) ⊆ B.
In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ EG0(S).
Since E(N) = P0(A) and A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ P0(N), we can assume that
S 6= N and B 6= A. We show that B ∈ E(S). Let σS ∈ ΣS be such that
B(σS) ⊆ B and for each i ∈ N \ S choose τ i such that f i = (N \ S,A).
Consider the action profile (σS , τN\S). In this profile, since B 6= A, S
contains at least one formed coalition. Let {S1, . . . , Sr} denote the set of
all formed coalitions within S; hence, for each j = 1, . . . , r and i ∈ Sj ,
σi = (f i, ki) with f i = (Sj , Bj) for some Bj ∈ E(Sj). Thus, for (σS , τN\S),
the set of formed coalitions is {S1, . . . , Sr, N \
⋃r
j=1 Sj}. Since Bj ∈ E(Sj)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, and ⋃rj=1 Sj ⊆ S, superadditivity and monotonicity
imply
⋂
j∈J Bj ∈ E(S). It remains to show that
⋂
j∈J Bj ⊆ B(σS), since
then monotonicity implies that B ∈ E(S).
Take a ∈ ⋂j∈J Bj . Since S 6= N , given ∑i∈S ki, N \ S is able to
choose
∑
i∈N\S k
i such that pi(σS , τN\S) = a. Hence a ∈ B(σS) for every
a ∈ ⋂j∈J Bj , which completes the proof.
4 Two-person effectivity functions
Throughout this section we assume that N = {1, 2}. The following result is
from Peleg et al. (2002), Remark 3.13.
Lemma 4.1. Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(ii) E is maximal.
4.1 One-sided incomplete information
In this subsection, we consider the case of one-sided incomplete information.
Without loss of generality, we assume that |T 1| = 1. This means that the
preference ordering of one player is commonly known, while the other player
possibly has multiple types.
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The main theorem of this subsection shows that in case of one-sided in-
complete information, ex post consistent representation imposes no further
conditions on the effectivity function compared to Nash consistent represen-
tation.
Theorem 4.2. Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function.
Let T = {(T 1, T 2) | |T 1| = 1}. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(ii) E has an ex post consistent representation for T .
Proof. To prove the implication (i)⇒ (ii), suppose E has a Nash consistent
representation, and let T ∈ T . Then E is maximal by Lemma 4.1. We
consider the representing game form G0 from Section 3 and show that this
game form always contains an EPE. Let R1 ∈W be the preference ordering
of player 1, and write a1R1 . . . R1am, where m = |A|. Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that L(aj , R1) ∈ EΓ(2) and L(aj+1, R1) /∈ EΓ(2) (where we define
L(am+1, R1) = ∅). Define B1 = {a1, . . . , aj}. By Proposition 2.1(iii), B1 ∈
EΓ(1). Consider the strategy profile where player 1 plays σ1 = (({1}, B1), 1),
and every type t2 ∈ T 2 plays σ2 = (({2}, L(a,R1)), k), with a ∈ B1 such that
aRt
2
b for all b ∈ B1 and with k such that pi(σ1, σ2) = a. It is straightforward
to check that this strategy profile is an EPE.
To prove the implication (ii)⇒ (i), suppose E has an ex post consistent
representation Γ for T . In particular, the game form Γ has an ex post
equilibrium if all types of player 2 have the same preference ordering. This
is equivalent to saying that E has a Nash consistent representation.
4.2 Two-sided incomplete information
In this subsection, still for two players, we consider the case of two-sided
incomplete information.
A player i ∈ N is a singleton player if all minimal sets of player i in E(i)
are singletons.
Example 4.3. Let A = {a, b} with a 6= b. There are two possible maximal
effectivity functions (if we omit effectivity functions obtainable from these
two by permutations of players or alternatives):
(i) E(1) = E({1, 2}) = {{a}, {b}, A} and E(2) = {A}
(ii) E(1) = E(2) = {{a}, A} and E({1, 2}) = {{a}, {b}, A}
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Note that in (i) player 1 is a ‘dictator’. Also, both effectivity functions
contain a singleton player.
The following theorem characterizes all two-player effectivity functions
with an ex post consistent representation for all information structures in
which both players have at least two types. In fact, its proof shows that if
there exists an ex post consistent representation of E, then any representa-
tion is ex post consistent.
Theorem 4.4. Let E be a maximal effectivity function. Let T = {(T 1, T 2) |
|T 1|, |T 2| ≥ 2}. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) E has an ex post consistent representation for T .
(ii) E contains a singleton player.
Proof. To prove the implication (i) ⇒ (ii), suppose E does not contain
a singleton player. We will present a preference profile for T ∈ T with
|T 1| = |T 2| = 2 such that no EPE exists in any representing game form.
Let B1 be minimal for player 1 with |B1| ≥ 2 and let B2 be minimal for
player 2 with |B2| ≥ 2 (these sets exist, since there is no singleton player).
Take a ∈ B1 ∩B2 6= ∅ (this is possible by superadditivity), and b ∈ B1 with
b 6= a (this is possible since |B1| ≥ 2). We can assume that |A| ≥ 3, because
if |A| = 2 then every maximal effectivity function contains a singleton player
(see Example 4.3). Consider the following preference profile:
pl. 1
Rt
1,1
Rt
1,2
B1 \ {a, b} b
a A \B1
b B1 \ {a, b}
A \B1 a
pl. 2
Rt
2,1
Rt
2,2
A \B1 A \B1
b a
a b
B1 \ {a, b} B1 \ {a, b}
Now let Γ be a representing game form and suppose that (s1, s2) is an
EPE in the game with this preference profile. We derive a contradiction.
(a) Claim: b ∈ B(s2(t2,1)).
Proof of claim: Since B1 \ {b} /∈ EΓ(1) (B1 is minimal for player 1),
Remark 2.6 implies pi(s1(t1,1), s2(t2,1)) /∈ B1 \{b}. Since A\B1 /∈ EΓ(2)
(by superadditivity), Remark 2.6 implies pi(s1(t1,1), s2(t2,1)) /∈ A \ B1.
Hence pi(s1(t1,1), s2(t2,1)) = b, which implies that b ∈ B(s2(t2,1)).
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(b) Claim: B(s1(t1,2)) = B1.
Proof of claim: Since b ∈ B(s2(t2,1)) by the previous claim, and b is
t1,2’s most preferred element, pi(s1(t1,2), s2(t2,1)) = b. This implies, by
Lemma 2.5 and minimality of B1, that B(s1(t1,2)) = B1.
Now, since B(s1(t1,2)) = B1 and a is t2,2 ’s most preferred alterna-
tive from B1, pi(s1(t1,2), s2(t2,2)) = a. Hence, by Remark 2.6, {a} =
L(pi(s1(t1,2), s2(t2,2)), Rt
1,2
) ∈ EΓ(2). Since a ∈ B2, this contradicts mini-
mality of B2.
In order to prove the implication (ii) ⇒ (i), assume that E contains a
singleton player, and let T ∈ T . We show that for any representing game
form Γ and any RT ∈ W T , the game (Γ, T,RT ) has an EPE. Without loss
of generality assume that player 1 is a singleton player. Let B2 = {a ∈ A |
{a} is a minimal set for player 1}. By Lemma 2.1(ii), we have B2 ∈ E(2).
Consider the strategy profile in which every type t1 ∈ T 1 plays an action
σ1 ∈ Σ1 such that B(σ1) = {a} for a ∈ B2 such that aRt1b for all b ∈ B2; and
in which every type t2 ∈ T 2 plays an action σ2 ∈ Σ2 such that B(σ2) = B2.
It is easy to see that this strategy profile is an EPE.
5 More than two players
Throughout this section, unless stated otherwise, we assume that |N | ≥ 3.
The following result is from Peleg et al. (2002), Remark 3.11.
Lemma 5.1. Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(ii) Bi /∈ E(N \ {i}) for all i ∈ N ⇒ A \
⋃n
i=1Bi 6= ∅.
5.1 One-sided incomplete information
In this subsection, we assume one-sided incomplete information. The main
theorem of this subsection shows that in case of one-sided incomplete in-
formation, ex post consistent representation imposes no further conditions
on the effectivity function compared to Nash consistent representation. So
Theorem 5.2 extends Theorem 4.2 to n > 2.
The game form that we introduce consists of two parts: actions that
assure representation, and equilibrium actions.
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Theorem 5.2. Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function.
Let T = {(T 1, . . . , Tn) | |T 1| ≥ 2 and |T i| = 1 for all i 6= 1}. The following
statements are equivalent:
(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(ii) E has an ex post consistent representation for T .
Proof. To prove the implication (i)⇒ (ii), assume that E has a Nash con-
sistent representation, and let T ∈ T . By Lemma 5.1, if Bi /∈ E(N \ {i})
for all i ∈ N then A \⋃ni=1Bi 6= ∅.
We extend G0 = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn;pi;A) from Section 3 to a game form G1 =
(Σ11, . . . ,Σ
n
1 ;pi1;A), as follows. A selection is a function φ : P0(A)→ A such
that φ(B) ∈ B for every B ∈ P0(A). Denote by Φ the set of all selections.
The set of actions of i ∈ N is the set Σi1 = {(f, k, φ) | f ∈ F i∪WN\{1} , k ∈
{1, . . . , |A|} and φ ∈ Φ}.
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ ΣN1 , where σi = (f i, ki, φi) ∈ Σi1 for every i ∈ N .
Define K = {i ∈ N | f i ∈ F i} and LRN\{1} = {i ∈ N | f i = RN\{1}} for all
RN\{1} ∈ WN\{1}. Note that every i ∈ N is either in K or in LRN\{1} for
some RN\{1} ∈WN\{1}. In order to define pi1(σ), we consider two cases.
(i) If |LRN\{1} | < n− 1 for all RN\{1} ∈WN\{1}, then we define pi1(σ) =
pi(σ), with pi as in G0 (Section 3).
(ii) Suppose |LRN\{1} | ≥ n − 1 for some RN\{1} ∈ WN\{1}. For every
i 6= 1, we define Bi /∈ E(N \{i}) as follows. Let Ri be the preference ordering
of player i in the profile RN\{1}, say a1Ri . . . Riam, where m = |A|. Choose
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that L(aj , Ri) ∈ E(N\{i}) and L(aj+1, Ri) /∈ E(N\{i})
(where we define L(am+1, Ri) = ∅). Then we define Bi = L(aj+1, Ri). Since
Bi /∈ E(N \ {i}) for all i 6= 1, we have A \
⋃
i 6=1Bi 6= ∅. This implies that
CR
N\{1} ∈ E(N \ {1}), where CRN\{1} = A \⋃i 6=1Bi. To define pi1(σ), we
distinguish two further subcases:
(ii.a) If LR
N\{1}
= N \ {i} with i 6= 1, then we define a = φ1(CRN\{1}), and
pi1(σ) = φi(L(a,Ri)).
(ii.b) If LR
N\{1}
= N \ {1} or LRN\{1} = N , then we define pi1(σ) =
φ1(CR
N\{1}
).
Claim: G1 is a representation of E.
To prove this claim, we first show that E(S) ⊆ EG1(S) for all S ∈ P0(N).
Let S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ E(S). We distinguish three cases.
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• |S| ≥ 2. Choose σi = ((S,B), 1, φi), with φi chosen arbitrarily, for
all i ∈ S. Then the coalition S is formed and hence by definition of pi1,
pi1(σS , τN\S) = pi(σS , τN\S) ∈ B for all τN\S ∈ ΣN\S1 . So, B(σS) ⊆ B.
• S = {1}. Choose σ1 = (({1}, B), 1, φ1), where φ1 is such that φ1(B′) ∈
B for all B′ with B′ ∩B 6= ∅.
If τN\{1} is such that f j = RN\{1} for all j ∈ N \{1}, we have CRN\{1} ∈
E(N \ {1}) and thus by superadditivity A \ CRN\{1} /∈ E(1). Hence, by
monotonicity, B ∩ CRN\{1} 6= ∅, which means that φ1 selects an alternative
from B.
For all other τN\{1} ∈ ΣN\{1}1 , coalition {1} forms. Thus, by definition
of pi1, pi1(σ1, τN\{1}) = pi(σ1, τN\{1}) ∈ B for all τN\{1} ∈ ΣN\{1}1 .
• S = {i}, with i 6= 1. Choose σi = (({i}, B), 1, φi), where φi is such
that φi(B′) ∈ B for all B′ with B′ ∩B 6= ∅.
If τN\{i} is such that f j = RN\{1} for all j ∈ N \ {i}, the definition of
CR
N\{1}
implies L(a,Ri) ∈ E(N \ {i}) for all a ∈ CRN\{1} . Then superad-
ditivity implies that A \ L(a,Ri) /∈ E(i). Hence B ∩ L(a,Ri) 6= ∅ for all
a ∈ CRN\{1} , which means that φi selects an alternative from B.
For all other τN\{i} ∈ ΣN\{i}1 , coalition {i} forms. Thus, by definition of
pi1, pi1(σi, τN\{i}) = pi(σi, τN\{i}) ∈ B for all τN\{i} ∈ ΣN\{i}1 .
In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ EG1(S).
Since E(N) = P0(A) and A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ P0(N), we can assume that
S 6= N and B 6= A. We show that B ∈ E(S). Let σS ∈ ΣS be such that
B(σS) ⊆ B. We only treat the case where |S| = n − 1 and σS is such that
f i = RN\{1} for some RN\{1} ∈ WN\{1} and for all i ∈ S. For all other
cases, it is sufficient to note that G1 is an extension of G0. We distinguish
two subcases.
• 1 /∈ S. Then, by construction of the game form, B(σS) = CRN\{1} . By
definition of CR
N\{1}
, we have CR
N\{1} ∈ E(N \ {1}) = E(S) and thus by
monotonicity B ∈ E(S).
• 1 ∈ S and j /∈ S. Then by construction B(σS) = L(a,Rj) for some
a ∈ CRN\{1} . By definition of CRN\{1} and since j 6= 1, we have L(a,Rj) ∈
E(N \{j}) = E(S) for all a ∈ CRN\{1} and thus, by monotonicity, B ∈ E(S).
This concludes the proof of the Claim.
We now prove that G1 is ex post consistent for T . Let RT ∈ W T .
Consider the following strategy profile s ∈ SN . For every ti ∈ T i with
i 6= 1, s(ti) = (RT−1 , 1, φi), with φi chosen arbitrarily. For every t1 ∈ T 1,
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s(t1) = (RT
−1
, 1, φ1) is such that φ1 selects alternative a ∈ CRN\{1} , where
aRt
1
b for all b ∈ CRN\{1} .
If t1 ∈ T 1 deviates, t1 is able to choose an alternative from CRN\{1} .
Since for a ∈ CRN\{1} we have aRt1b for all b ∈ CRN\{1} , t1 is not able to
improve. If ti ∈ T i, with i 6= 1, deviates, ti is able to choose from L(a,Rti).
Since aRt
i
b for all b ∈ L(a,Rti), ti is not able to improve. Hence this profile
is an EPE.
For the implication (ii)⇒ (i), assume that E has an ex post consistent
representation Γ for T . In particular, the game form Γ should contain an ex
post equilibrium if all types of player 1 have the same preference ordering.
This is equivalent to saying that E has a Nash consistent representation.
5.2 General incomplete information
In this subsection, we characterize effectivity functions that have an ex post
consistent representation for any number of types. The next theorem ex-
tends Theorem 4.4 to n > 2.
Theorem 5.3. Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function.
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) E has an ex post consistent representation.
(ii) There exists an i ∈ N and C ∈ E(N \ {i}) such that {a} ∈ E(N \ {j})
for all a ∈ C and for every j 6= i.
Proof. We first prove the implication (i) ⇒ (ii). We assume that for every
i ∈ N and every Bi ∈ E(N \{i}), there is a ∈ Bi such that {a} /∈ E(N \{j})
for some j 6= i. First, we define a specific preference profile. Second, we show
that for this particular preference profile no EPE exists in any representing
game form.
We define the sets A1,i = {a ∈ A | {a} /∈ E(N \ {i}) and {a} ∈
E(N \ {j}) for all j 6= i} for all i ∈ N , and A2 = {a ∈ A | there are i, j ∈
N, with i 6= j, such that {a} /∈ E(N \ {i}) and {a} /∈ E(N \ {j})}. By our
assumption,
⋃n
i=1A1,i ∪ A2 = A. Moreover, A1,i ∩ A2 = ∅ for all i ∈ N and
A1,i ∩A1,j = ∅ for all i 6= j.
The definition of the announced preference profile will be given by an
algorithm, as follows. We start with an information structure (T 1, . . . , Tn)
such that |T i| = 1 for all i ∈ N . Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T 1 × · · · × Tn
denote the corresponding type vector. In the algorithm, for every i ∈ N ,
two sets Hi ⊆ A and Li ⊆ A are defined, and a preference ordering Rti
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over Hi ∪ Li such that for all a ∈ Hi and all b ∈ Li, aP tib (alternatives in
Hi are strictly preferred to alternatives in Li). We iteratively extend this
preference ordering by adding an a ∈ A to either Hi or Li for every i ∈ N ,
until Hi ∪ Li = A. Under a specific condition, extra types may be added.
See Algorithm 1.2
Algorithm 1 Construction of a preference profile
for i := 1, . . . , n do
while A1,i 6= ∅ do
Take a ∈ A1,i;
Li := Li ∪ {a} such that aP tib for all b ∈ Li;
For all j 6= i, Hj := Hj ∪ {a} such that bP tja for all b ∈ Hj ;
A1,i := A1,i \ {a};
end while
end for
while A2 6= ∅ do
Take a ∈ A2;
Take i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, such that {a} /∈ E(N \ {i}) and {a} /∈
E(N \ {j});
Li := Li ∪ {a} such that aP tib for all b ∈ Li;
For all k 6= i, Hk := Hk ∪ {a} such that bP tka for all b ∈ Hk;
if L(a,Rt
k
) ∈ E(N \ {k}) for all k ∈ N then
T i := T i ∪ t′i and T j := T j ∪ t′j , where
Rt
′i
A2 \ {a} ∪ Lj
Hj \ {a}
a
Rt
′j
Li \ {a}
Hi ∪A2 \ {a}
a
;
end if
A2 := A2 \ {a};
end while
Consider the constructed preference profile RT with associated infor-
mation structure T and let Γ be a representing game form. Suppose that
(s1, . . . , sn) is an EPE in (Γ, T,RT ). We derive a contradiction.
Let i ∈ N . Since for all a ∈ A1,i, {a} ∈ EΓ(N \ {j}) for all j 6= i, our
initial assumption implies A1,i /∈ EΓ(N \{i}). Thus, for all i ∈ N and for all
2See Example 5.6 for an illustration of this algorithm. The constructed preference pro-
file can also be defined directly, but the description via the algorithm is more transparent.
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a ∈ A1,i, we have L(a,Rti) /∈ EΓ(N \ {i}). Hence, by Remark 2.6, we have
pi(s(t)) /∈ ⋃ni=1A1,i and thus pi(s(t)) ∈ A2 with L(pi(s(t)), Rti) ∈ EΓ(N \{i})
for all i ∈ N .
Let a = pi(s(t)). If no new types were added in the algorithm, then there
was a player k ∈ N such that L(a,Rtk) = L(pi(s(t)), Rtk) /∈ E(N \ {k}), but
this contradicts Remark 2.6. So we may assume that there are i, j ∈ N ,
with i 6= j, be such that t′i and t′j are added for a. In the step of the
algorithm where t′i and t′j are added, a becomes the most preferred element
of Li for ti and the least preferred element of Hj for tj . Since each remaining
alternative b ∈ A2 \ {a} becomes either the new best alternative of Li or Lj
or the new worst alternative of Hi or Hj , we have at the end of the algorithm
bP t
i
a and aP t
j
b for all remaining b ∈ A2 \ {a}. So in fact, the preference
orderings of t′i and t′j are as follows:
Rt
′i
L(a,Rt
j
) \ {a}
A \ L(a,Rtj )
a
Rt
′j
L(a,Rt
i
) \ {a}
A \ L(a,Rti)
a
.
Observe the following:
(a) Lemma 2.5 implies that B(s−i(t−i)) ⊆ L(a,Rti). Since L(a,Rti) ∈
E(N \{i}) by the condition for adding types t′i and t′j in the algorithm,
and {a} /∈ E(N \ {i}) since a ∈ A2, we have L(a,Rti) \ {a} 6= ∅.
Since a is t′i’s least preferred element, we have pi(s−i(t−i), si(t′i)) ∈
L(a,Rt
i
) \ {a}. But this implies that pi(s−i,j(t−i,j), si(t′i), sj(t′j)) 6= a
and pi(s−i,j(t−i,j), si(t′i), sj(t′j)) /∈ A \ L(a,Rti).3
(b) Lemma 2.5 implies that B(s−j(t−j)) ⊆ L(a,Rtj ). Similarly as in (a),
we have L(a,Rt
j
) \ {a} 6= ∅. Since a is t′j ’s least preferred element,
we have pi(s−j(t−j), sj(t′j)) ∈ L(a,Rtj ) \ {a}. But this implies that
pi(s−i,j(t−i,j), si(t′i), sj(t′j)) /∈ A \ L(a,Rtj ).
If we show that {a}∪A \L(a,Rti)∪A \L(a,Rtj ) = A, then we have proved
that there is no Nash outcome for (t−i,j , t′i, t′j), which is in contradiction
with the assumption that (s1, . . . , sn) is an EPE. Note that it is sufficient
to show that L(a,Rt
i
) \ {a} ⊆ A \ L(a,Rtj ).
Take b ∈ L(a,Rti), with b 6= a. Since aP tib, in the algorithm b became
the new best element of Li for ti before a became the new best element of Li
3We define s−i,j(t−i,j) as the vector (sk(tk))k 6=i,j
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for ti. So also, b became the new worst element of Hj for tj before a became
the new worst element of Hj for tj . Hence bP t
j
a and thus b ∈ A \L(a,Rtj ).
This concludes the proof of the implication (i)⇒ (ii).
We now prove the implication (ii) ⇒ (i). We assume that there exists
an i ∈ N and C ∈ E(N \ {i}) such that {a} ∈ E(N \ {j}) for all a ∈ C and
for every j 6= i. W.l.o.g. assume i = 1. We write C = {a1, . . . , a|C|}.
We extend G0 = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn;pi;A) from Section 3 to a game form G2 =
(Σ12, . . . ,Σ
n
2 ;pi2;A) as follows. The set of actions of i ∈ N is the set Σi2 =
{(f, k) | f ∈ F i ∪ {v} and k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}}.
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ ΣN2 , where σi = (f i, ki) ∈ Σi2 for every i ∈ N .
Define K = {i ∈ N | f i ∈ F i} and L = {i ∈ N | f i = v}. Then N = K ∪ L
and K ∩ L = ∅. To define pi2(σ), we distinguish two cases:
(i) |L| < n − 1. Then pi2(σ) = pi(σ), with pi the outcome function of G0
(see Section 3).
(ii) |L| ≥ n− 1. Then pi2(σ) = ap ∈ C, where p = k1 (mod |C|) + 1.
Claim: G2 is a representation of E.
To prove this claim we first show that E(S) ⊆ EG2(S) for all S ∈ P0(N).
Let S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ E(S). We distinguish three cases
• |S| ≥ 2. Choose σi = ((S,B), 1) for all i ∈ S. Then coalition S is
formed and hence by definition of pi2, pi2(σS , τN\S) ∈ B for all τN\S ∈ ΣN\S2 .
So, B(σS) ⊆ B.
• S = {1}. Choose σ1 = (({1}, B), k1), where k1 is defined as follows.
Since C ∈ E(N \ {1}), superadditivity implies that A \ C /∈ E(1) and thus
B∩C 6= ∅. This implies that we can choose k1 such that pi2(σ1, τN\{1}) ∈ B if
τN\{1} is such that f j = v for all j ∈ N \{1}. For all other τN\{1} ∈ ΣN\{1}2 ,
it is sufficient to note that coalition {1} forms.
• S = {i}, with i 6= 1. Choose σi = (({i}, B), 1). Since {a} ∈ E(N \ {i})
for all a ∈ C, superadditivity implies that B ⊇ C. Thus, by definition of
pi2, pi2(σi, τN\{i}) ∈ B for all τN\{i} ∈ ΣN\{i}2 .
In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ EG2(S).
We show that B ∈ E(S). Let σS ∈ ΣS such that B(σS) ⊆ B. We only treat
the case where |S| = n − 1 and σS is such that f i = v for all i ∈ S. For
all other cases, it is sufficient to note that G2 is an extension of G0. We
distinguish two cases.
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• 1 /∈ S. Then, by construction of the game form, B(σS) = C. By
assumption, C ∈ E(N \ {1}) = E(S) and thus by monotonicity B ∈ E(S).
• 1 ∈ S and j /∈ S. Then by construction B(σS) = {a} for some
a ∈ C. By assumption, {a} ∈ E(N \{j}) = E(S), and thus by monotonicity
B ∈ E(S).
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Now let T be an arbitrary information structure. It remains to prove
that G2 is ex post consistent for T . Let RT ∈ W T . Consider the following
strategy profile s ∈ SN . For every ti ∈ T i, with i 6= 1, s(ti) = (v, 1). For
every t1 ∈ T 1, s(t1) = (v, k1) such that k1 selects alternative a ∈ C, where
aRt
1
b for all b ∈ C.
If t1 ∈ T 1 deviates, t1 is able to choose an alternative from C. Since
aRt
1
b for all b ∈ C, t1 is not able to improve. If ti ∈ T i, with i 6= 1,
deviates, the outcome does not change. Hence this profile is an EPE.
Remark 5.4. It is not difficult to verify that Condition (ii) of Theorem 5.3
implies condition (ii) of Lemma 5.1.
Corollary 5.5. Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function
with a Nash consistent representation. If E(N \{i}) = {A} for some i ∈ N ,
then E has an ex post consistent representation.
Proof. If E(N \ {i}) = {A} for some i ∈ N , then Lemma 5.1 (ii) implies
that E(N \ {j}) = P0(A) for all j 6= i. By Theorem 5.3, E has an ex post
consistent representation.
Example 5.6. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c, d, e}. Let E be a super-
additive and monotonic effectivity function with
E({1, 2}) = {{c}, {d}, {e}, {a, b}}+
E({1, 3}) = {{a}, {b}, {e}, {c, d}}+
E({2, 3}) = {{a}, {c}, {b, d}, {b, e}, {d, e}}+ .
(The superscript + indicates that all supersets are included as well.) We
illustrate the procedure of Algorithm 1. We have A1,1 = {e}, A1,2 = {c},
A1,3 = {a} and A2 = {b, d}. After the first while loop, we have the following
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preference profile:
Rt
1
c
a
. . .
. . .
e
Rt
2
e
a
. . .
. . .
c
Rt
3
e
c
. . .
. . .
a
After the second while loop, we have the following preference profile:
Rt
1
Rt
′1
Rt
′′1
c a, d c
a c, e a, b, e
d b d
b
e
Rt
2
Rt
′2
e b, e
a a, c
b d
d
c
Rt
3
Rt
′3
e e
c a, c, d
b b
d
a
This is the profile, used in the proof of Theorem 5.3, for which there is no ex
post Nash equilibrium. However, in this example there is another preference
profile with less types for which also no representing game form with an EPE
exists. This can be shown by using similar arguments (omitted here) as in
the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Rt
1,1
Rt
1,2
a c
d b
c e
e a
b d
Rt
2,1
Rt
2,2
a d
b a
e b
c e
d c
Rt
3,1
Rt
3,2
e e
d a
d c
b d
a b
Thus, the algorithm used in the proof of Theorem 5.3 is not always the
most efficient one in terms of the number of types needed in order to obtain
nonexistence of an ex post Nash equilibrium.
Example 5.7. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c}. Consider the following
effectivity function: E(1) = E(2) = {{a, b}, A}, E(3) = {A}, E({1, 2}) =
{{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}}+ and E({1, 3}) = E({2, 3}) = {{a}, {b}}+. By The-
orem 5.3, this effectivity function has an ex post consistent representation.
Consider the following representation:
M1 L M R
T a a a
C a b c
B a c b
M2 L M R
T b b b
C b c a
B b a c
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in which Σ1 = {T,C,B}, Σ2 = {L,M,R} and Σ3 = {M1,M2}. This rep-
resentation is ex post consistent for any T . Namely, the following strategy
profile always constitutes an EPE: all t1 ∈ T 1 play T , all t2 ∈ T 2 play L and
all t3 ∈ T 3 with aRt3b playM1 and all t3 ∈ T 3 with bP t3a playM2. Observe
that E has no ‘dictator’ (i.e., a player who is effective for every singleton.
In the given equilibrium, however, player 3 can act as if he is the dictator
over {a, b}.
5.3 Maximally two types per player
Theorem 5.3 characterizes all effectivity functions for which no ex post con-
sistent representation exists, i.e.: there is no game form that represents the
effectivity function and that has an ex post Nash equilibrium for any in-
formation structure T = (T 1, . . . , Tn) and any profile of preferences for all
types. Although it is not difficult to derive an upper bound on the number
of types needed (e.g., by considering Algorithm 1), it is less obvious how to
derive a sharp upper bound (depending on the effectivity function at hand).
From the preceding sections we already know that ex post consistency is
implied by Nash consistency for information structures where at most one
player has more than type.
In this subsection we provide a few partial answers to this question for
other cases. Specifically, the following proposition presents a condition un-
der which at most two types per player are needed to show that no ex post
consistent representation exists. Part (a) follows almost directly from The-
orem 5.3; the new contribution is part (b), which gives a condition under
which it is sufficient to have two players with two types each in order to
have nonexistence of an ex post consistent representation, all other players
having just one type.
Proposition 5.8. Let E have a Nash consistent representation, but no ex
post consistent representation. Then:
(a) There exists an i ∈ N and a minimal Bi ∈ E(N \ {i}), with |Bi| ≥ 2,
such that there is a j 6= i with {a} /∈ E(N \ {j}) for an a ∈ Bi.
(b) For i, Bi, a and j as in (a), if either A \Bi /∈ E(N \ {j}) or A \Bi ∈
E(N \{j}) is minimal for N \{j}, with |A\Bi| ≥ 2, then E has no ex
post consistent representation for T , where T = {(T 1, . . . , Tn) | |T i| =
|T j | = 2, |T k| = 1 for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}}.
Proof. (a) Suppose, contrary to what we wish to show, that |Bi| = 1 for all
minimal Bi ∈ E(N \ {i}) for all i ∈ N . For all i ∈ N , define Bi = {a ∈
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A | {a} /∈ E(N \ {i})}. Then Bi /∈ E(N \ {i}) for all i ∈ N . Since E
has no ex post consistent representation, Theorem 5.3 implies for all a ∈ A
that {a} /∈ E(N \ {i}) for some i ∈ N . But then A \ ⋃ni=1Bi = ∅, which
contradicts with the assumption that E has a Nash consistent representation
(Lemma 5.1).
(b) Let i, Bi, a and j be as in (a). Let T satisfy |T i| = 2, |T j | = 2 and
|T k| = 1 for all k 6= i, j.
First suppose that A\Bi /∈ E(N \{j}). Consider the following preference
profile:
pl. j
Rt
j,1
Rt
j,2
Bi \ {a, b} b
a A \Bi
b Bi \ {a, b}
A \Bi a
pl. i
Rt
i,1
Rt
i,2
A \Bi A \Bi
b a
a b
Bi \ {a, b} Bi \ {a, b}
By using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, it follows,
similarly as there, that there is no EPE in any representing game form.
Second, suppose that A \ Bi ∈ E(N \ {j}) is minimal for N \ {j} and
|A \ Bi| ≥ 2. Define Bj = A \ Bi. Since E has no ex post consistent
representation, by Theorem 5.3 there is some c ∈ Bj and k ∈ N with k 6= j
such that {c} /∈ E(N \ {k}). Take d ∈ Bj with d 6= c.
If k = i, consider the following preference profile:
pl. j
Rt
j,1
Rt
j,2
Bi \ {a, b} b
a Bi \ {a, b}
b c
d d
c Bj \ {c, d}
Bj \ {c, d} a
pl. i
Rt
i,1
Rt
i,2
Bj \ {c, d} d
c Bj \ {c, d}
d a
b b
a Bi \ {a, b}
Bi \ {a, b} c
By using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, it follows
that there is no Nash equilibrium outcome between (t−i,j , ti,1, tj,1) in any
representing game form, and thus no EPE.
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If k 6= i, consider the following preference profile:
pl. k
Rt
k
d
Bi
Bj \ {c, d}
c
pl. j
Rt
j,1
Rt
j,2
Bi \ {a, b} b
a Bi \ {a, b}
b c
d d
c Bj \ {c, d}
Bj \ {c, d} a
pl. i
Rt
i,1
Rt
i,2
A \Bi A \Bi
b a
a b
Bi \ {a, b} Bi \ {a, b}
By using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, it follows that
there is no Nash equilibrium outcome between (t−i,j,k, ti,1, tj,1, tk,1) in any
representing game form, and thus no EPE.
We conclude with an example of an effectivity function that has no ex
post consistent representation. However, this effectivity function has an ex
post consistent representation for two types per player.
Example 5.9. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c, d, e}. Let E be a su-
peradditive and monotonic effectivity function with E({1, 2}) = P0(A) and
E({1, 3}) = E({2, 3}) = {{x, y} | x, y ∈ A, x 6= y}. By Theorem 5.3, E has
no ex post consistent representation. Let T = {(T 1, T 2, T 3) | |T 1| = |T 2| =
|T 3| = 2}. Then E has an ex post consistent representation for T . Such a
representation is constructed in the Appendix.
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A Construction of the representation in Exam-
ple 5.9
The construction proceeds in several steps.
Step 1 We modify G0 = (Σ1,Σ2,Σ3;pi;A) from Section 3 to a game form
G3 = (Σ13,Σ
2
3,Σ
3
3;pi3;A), as follows. Let T˜ = (T
1, T 2). The set of ac-
tions of i ∈ N is the set Σi3 = {(f, r, k, φ) | f ∈ F i ∪W T˜ , r ∈ T i , k ∈
{1, . . . , |A|} and φ ∈ Φ}. Here, Φ is the set of all selections, as in the game
form G1 in the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Let σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΣN3 , where σi = (f i, ri, ki, φi) ∈ Σi3 for i ∈ N .
Define K = {i ∈ N | f i ∈ F i} and LRT˜ = {i ∈ N | f i = RT˜ } for all
RT˜ ∈ W T˜ . Note that every i ∈ N is either in K or in LRT˜ for some
RT˜ ∈W T˜ . We define pi3(σ) as follows.
• If |LRT˜ | < 2 for all RT˜ ∈ W T˜ , then pi3(σ) = pi(σ) with pi as in G0 (see
Section 3).
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• If |LRT˜ | ≥ 2 for some RT˜ ∈ W T˜ , then we distinguish two cases. Assume
without loss of generality that Rt
1,1
orders the elements of A as abcde.
(i) There are x, y, z ∈ A, with x 6= y, x 6= z and y 6= z, such that xRt1,1z
and yRt
1,1
z, and xRt
1,2
z and yRt
1,2
z. Then we define
pi3(σ) =

x if [LR
T˜
= {1, 2} or LRT˜ = N ] and xRr2y.
y if [LR
T˜
= {1, 2} or LRT˜ = N ] and yP r2x.
φ2({x, y}) if LRT˜ = {1, 3}.
φ1({x, z}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3} and xRr2y.
φ1({y, z}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3} and yP r2z.
(ii) There are x, y ∈ {a, b, c}, with x 6= y, such that dRt1,2x and dRt1,2y, and
eRt
1,2
x and eRt
1,2
y. Then we define
pi3(σ) =

x if LR
T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N}, r1 = t1,1, and xRr2y.
y if LR
T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N}, r1 = t1,1, and yP r2x.
d if LR
T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N}, r1 = t1,2, and dRr2e.
e if LR
T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N}, r1 = t1,2, and eP r2d.
φ2({x, y}) if LRT˜ = {1, 3} and r1 = t1,1.
φ2({d, e}) if LRT˜ = {1, 3} and r1 = t1,2.
φ1({x, d}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, xRr2y, and dRr2e.
φ1({x, e}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, xRr2y, and eP r2d.
φ1({y, d}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, yP r2x, and dRr2e.
φ1({y, e}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, yP r2x, and eP r2d.
We now show that the game form G3 is properly defined, in particular,
that the cases (i) and (ii) cover all preference orderings. Suppose we are not
in case (i). Then there are no x, y, z ∈ A, with x 6= y, x 6= z and y 6= z, such
that xRt
1,1
z and yRt
1,1
z, and xRt
1,2
z and yRt
1,2
z. For z = e, this implies
that there is at most one alternative preferred to e for t1,2.
If dRt
1,2
e, then this means eP t
1,2
a, eP t
1,2
b and eP t
1,2
c and by transitivity,
dP t
1,2
a, dP t
1,2
b and dP t
1,2
c. Hence we are in case (ii).
If eP t
1,2
d, then for z = d, the supposition that we are not in case (i)
implies that there is at most one alternative from {a, b, c} preferred to d for
t1,2. This means there are at least two alternatives from {a, b, c} to which d
is strictly preferred. By transitivity, e is also strictly preferred to these two
alternatives and hence we are in case (ii).
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Step 2 We show that G3 is a representation of E. First, we show that
E(S) ⊆ EG3(S) for all S ∈ P0(N). Let S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ E(S). We
distinguish three cases:
(a) |S| ≥ 2. Choose σS such that f i = (S,B) for all i ∈ S. Then the
coalition S is formed and hence by definition of pi3, pi3(σS , τN\S) ∈ B for all
τN\S ∈ ΣN\S3 . So, B(σS) ⊆ B.
(b) S = {i}, with i = 1, 2. Choose σi such that f i = ({i}, B) and φi is
such that φi(B′) ∈ B for all B′ with B′ ∩B 6= ∅.
If τN\{i} is such that f j = RT˜ for all j ∈ N \ {i}, then player i is able to
choose from {x, y} for some x, y ∈ A and x 6= y. Since {x, y} ∈ E(N \ {i}),
superadditivity implies A \ {x, y} /∈ E(1). Hence B ∩ {x, y} 6= ∅, which
means that φi will select an alternative from B.
For all other τN\{i} ∈ ΣN\{i}3 , it is sufficient to note that coalition {i}
forms. Thus, by definition of pi3, pi3(σi, τN\{i}) ∈ B for all τN\{i} ∈ ΣN\{i}3 .
(c) S = {3}. It is sufficient to note that since E({1, 2}) = P0(A), super-
additivity implies that E(3) = {A}.
In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ EG3(S).
Since E(N) = P0(A) and A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ P0(N), we can assume that
S 6= N and B 6= A. We show that B ∈ E(S). Let σS ∈ ΣS be such that
B(σS) ⊆ B. We only treat the case |S| = 2 and σS is such that f i = RT˜ for
some RT˜ ∈W T˜ and for all i ∈ S. For all other cases, it is sufficient to note
that G3 is an extension of G0.
If 3 /∈ S, then it is sufficient to note that E(S) = E({1, 2}) = P0(A).
If 3 ∈ S, then by construction B(σS) = {x, y} for some x, y ∈ A and
x 6= y. Since {x, y} ∈ E(S), monotonicity implies that B ∈ E(S).
Step 3 It remains to prove that G3 is ex post consistent. Let RT ∈ W T .
Consider the following strategy profile s ∈ SN . For every ti ∈ T i and for all
i ∈ N , s(ti) = (RT˜ , ti, 1, φi), with φi chosen arbitrarily.
For case (i) in Step 1, all t1 ∈ T 1 prefer x to z and y to z and all
t2 ∈ T 2 obtain their preferred element from {x, y}. Hence these types have
no incentive to deviate.
For case (ii) in Step 1, t1,1 ∈ T 1 prefers x and y to d and e, whereas
t1,2 ∈ T 1 prefers d and e to x and y. Moreover, if r1 = t1,1, all t2 ∈ T 2 obtain
their preferred element from {x, y}, and if r1 = t1,2, all t2 ∈ T 2 obtain their
preferred element from {d, e}. Thus, none of these types is able to improve.
Since no t3 ∈ T 3 is able to affect the outcome under this strategy profile,
we have an EPE.
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